Stag hunt

In game theory, the stag hunt (also referred to as the assurance game, trust dilemma or common interest game) describes a situation or game where participants would be better off cooperating to achieve a more ambitious goal (hunting a stag together, which succeeds), but can choose a safer option (hunting a hare on one's own) that protects them from a bad outcome (hunting a stag alone, which fails, while the other hunts a hare). This sets up a stylized conflict between safety and social cooperation based on the mathematical payoffs of each option. In the most common account of this dilemma, two hunters must decide separately, and without the other knowing, whether to hunt a stag or a hare. However, both hunters know the only way to successfully hunt a stag is with the other's help. One hunter can catch a hare alone with less effort and less time, but it is worth far less than a stag and has much less meat. But both hunters would be better off if both choose the more ambitious and more rewarding goal of getting the stag, giving up some autonomy in exchange for the other hunter's cooperation and added might. This situation is often seen as a useful analogy for many kinds of social cooperation, such as international agreements on climate change. The stag hunt problem originated with philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau in his Discourse on Inequality, although the most common mathematized formulation differs from the original presentation.