Value pluralism

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In ethics value pluralism is the philosophical concept (or idea) that there are several fundamental values that may be equally correct and yet in conflict with each other. (Also known as ethical pluralism or moral pluralism, the phrase is sometimes hyphenated—especially to emphasize that the adjectival term "value" is not to be taken as a verb-form.) In many cases, value-pluralism postulates that incompatible values may be incommensurable—in the sense that there is no objective ordering of them in terms of importance. Value pluralism is opposed to value monism, which states that all other forms of value can be mutually commensured or reduced to a single form. Value-pluralism is a set of values in itself, and is a theory in metaethics rather than of normative ethics. Oxford philosopher and historian of ideas Isaiah Berlin is credited with being the first to popularize a substantial work describing the theory of objective value-pluralism, bringing it to the attention of academia (cf. the Isaiah Berlin Virtual Library). The related idea that fundamental values can and, in some cases, do conflict with each other is prominent in the political economy of Max Weber, who uses the term "polytheism" to describe contradictory yet rationalized immaterial tendencies, such as the state and the market.